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FEDERAL PRoCEDuRE-VENU:E-lliGHT oF Ar.mN UNDER DIVERSITY OF
C1TIZENSmP CLAUSE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)-Plaintiff, a citizen of France and
resident of New York City, sought a declaratory judgment and restraining order
against several defendants residing in different states. On the theory that a
suit involving a citizen of France and citizens of the United States constituted
"diversity of citizenship" under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a), and therefore could
be brought where all of the plaintiffs or all of the defendants resided, the action
was laid in the federal district court of New York where the plaintiff resided.
Defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that this was "alienage," not
"diversity of citizenship" as intended under the code, and consequently the suit
could not be brought in the district of the plaintiff's residence. Held, motion
sustained. By the words "diversity of citizenship" the legislature did not intend
to change the old rule that aliens could sue only in the judicial district where
all of the defendants resided. Because all of the defendants did not reside in
the same district, several would have to be dropped or the case dismissed. Du
Roure v. Alvord, (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 166.
Prior to the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the basic venue provision
which had stood virtually unchanged for 61 years read in part: ".•. where
the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact the action is between citizens of
different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of
either the plaintiff or defendant • . ."1 Under this provision it was clearly

1 This provision was first enacted on March 3, 1887. 24 Stat. L. 552, c. 373, §1
(1887).
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decided that suits involving aliens and citizens of this country, generally referred
to as alienage jurisdiction, would not be accorded the venue privileges of
diversity cases. If the action was against an alien, venue could be laid in any
district where valid service could be made.2 Where the alien was the plaintiff,
the action had to be brought in the district where all the defendants resided,
unless right of venue was waived.3 However, in the 1948 revision of the code
the words "diversity of citizenship" were substituted for "citizens of different
States."4 Though the phrase "diversity of citizenship" had frequently been
used by the courts in referring to the old provision,5 this seems to be the first
time the words actually have appeared in a venue provision of the federal code.
By employing this phrase did the legislature intend to broaden the former venue
provision so as to include aliens, or is the old rule or discrimination to remain
unchanged? On the surface the answer appears to lie in section 1332 of the
revised code. This provision is headed by the catchline ''Diversity of citizenship;
amount in controversy" and includes among the cases in which the district
court has jurisdiction suits between "citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof."6 The language of this section has led such a
noted scholar as Professor Moore to conclude that "diversity of citizenship" was
broadened under the 1948 revision to include alienage jurisdiction, and therefore alien plaintiffs could qualify under the special venue provision of section
139l(a).7 This conclusion seems almost inevitable except for one pitfall. The
statute which gave birth to the 1948 revision also provides: "No inference of
a legislative construction is to be drawn . • • by reason of the catchlines used
in such title." 8 In deleting the catchline the value of section 1332 in interpreting "diversity of citizenship" is destroyed. All that remains is an enumeration
of instances, including alienage, wherein the district court has jurisdiction,
which alone is meaningless for venue purposes. The only other ground that
would indicate what the legislature intended is a reviser's note to section 1391
and its treatment of the word "reside." Part (a) of this section provides that
if the action is one based solely on diversity of citizenship, the suit may be
brought "where all plaintiffs or defendants reside.''9 Under the usual defini2 In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 14 S.Ct. 221 (1893); Bator v. Boosey & Hawkes,
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 294.
3 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496,
14 S.Ct. 401 (1894); Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., (D.C. Ohio 1917) 245 F. 155.
4 Section 139l(a) reads: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l39l(a).
5 13 WoRDs AND PHRASES, Diverse Citizenship, p. 56 (1940), gives several decisions
using the old term "diverse citizenship." For a number of later cases using "diversity of
citizenship" see 13 WoRDs AND PHRASES, Cumnlative Pocket Supp., p. 13 (1954).
6 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1332.
7 MooRB, CoMMBNTARY oN U.S. JamcrAL Cons 190 (1949).
8 This is easy to overlook inasmuch as it is in the enacting statute but not in the main
body of the code itself. 62 Stat. L. 991, §33 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A., Miscellaneous Provisions, p. 339 (1950).
9 Note 4 supra.
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tion of "reside" an alien could be as much a resident as anyone else.10 But
the legal connotation of this word may vary according to the particular statute
in which it is used.11 Its technical meaning in this section of the code, as
suggested by the reviser's note, throws additional light on the interpretation
of the rest of the provision. The reviser's note states: 'Word 'reside' was substituted for 'whereof he is an inhabitant' for clarity inasmuch as 'inhabitant'
and 'reside' are synonymous."12 Because of the peculiar wording of the provision prior to 1948, the courts had held that an alien was not an "inhabitant"
for the purposes of ilie venue provision of the judicial code. 13 This reasoning
would not have any bearing on the new wording in the 1948 version except
for the reviser's note. By making "resident" synonymous with "inhabitant" as
it stood in the old provision, it would follow that an alien can not "reside" in a
judicial district within the meaning of section 1391 (a). If an alien cannot
be considered a resident under this clause, then alienage jurisdiction can hardly
be included within the meaning of "diversity of citizenship." This was the
line of reasoning followed by the court in concluding that the old rule requiring aliens to bring suit in the judicial district where all the defendants reside
still stands despite the rephrasing of the 1948 revision.14 Professor Moore, a
consultant on the 1948 revision, states an almost identical hypothetical in his
Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code and comes out with the opposite
result. 15 Though Moore does not say how he reached his conclusion, it appears
to be based on the catchline of section 1332. He also makes reference to the
reviser's note to section 1391,16 but fails to recognize its significance in relation

10 Bouvier defines residence as "personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode."
3 Boovnm, L.Aw Th:cnoNARY, 8th ed., p. 2920 (1914). Equally broad, Black gives as one
definition "living or dwelling in a certain place permanently or for a considerable length of
time." BLAcK's LAw Th:cnoNARY, 3d ed., 1543 (1933).
11 In re Jones, 341 Pa. 329, 19 A. (2d) 280 (1941); McGrath v. Stevenson, 194
Wash. 160, 77 P. (2d) 608 (1938).
12The words "whereof he is an inhabitant" in what was formerly 28 U.S.C. §112
refer to the place where the action is brought if not based on diversity. Thus the corresponding provision in the 1948 revision would be part (b) of section 1391 which provides
if not based on diversity the action must be brought "only in the judicial district where all
defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l391(b). But inasmuch as the word "reside" is
also used in part (a) referring to diversity jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to assume that
it has the same meaning in one part as it has in the other.
13 The first part of the old venue provision was worded as follows: "no civil suit shall
be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant." 24 Stat. L. 552, c.
373, §1 (1887). If "inhabitant" as used here included aliens and an alien was traveling
in the United States, yet was not an inhabitant of any judicial district, the citizen would
have no place to bring the suit. By this interpretation the courts of the United States
would have been open to suits by aliens against citizens, but not to actions by citizens
against aliens. To avoid this bizarre result it was early decided that "inhabitant" did not
include aliens. In re Hohorst, note 2 supra.
14 See also Stamatiou v. Miller, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 556, for another
decision following the old rule in excluding aliens after the 1948 revision.
15 MooRE, CoMMENTARY ON U.S. JUDICIAL CoDB 192 (1949).
16 Jbid., footnote.

1954]

REcENT DECISIONS

293

to the problem of alien residence. Between the two interpretations it would
seem that the court stands on the finner ground in avoiding the catchline of
section 1332.17 Inasmuch as Congress has expressly discriminated against alien
defendants in part (d) of section 1391,18 it is not unreasonable to conclude
that it intended the same treatment when the alien is the plaintiff. Perhaps the
real reason for the change in language of section 1391 (a), if not to include
aliens, was to extend the venue privileges of this section to citizens of the territories and the District of Columbia. Part (b) of section 1332 clearly indicates
that the citizens of the territories and the District of Columbia are to be on
par with the citizens of the 48 states in diversity jurisdiction.19 By using the
phrase "diversity of citizenship" they would be afforded equal venue treatment,
whereas under the old provision they would not.
Richard M. Adams

17 It is interesting to note that Judge Dimock cites Moore in support of one point in
his decision, principal case at 169, yet completely ignores the fact that this same author in
another volume ends up with a directly contrary conclusion.
18 "An alien may be sued in any district." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l39l(d).
19 In giving the district court jurisdiction of controversies involving citizens of different
states, Congress defined the word "states" to include the territories and the District of
Columbia. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1332(b).

